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The issue on discretion in law is rather 
complicated and debatable. Its complexity is 
stipulated first of all by a many-sided nature of 
the concept of law per se, and debatability is 
caused by the absence of unity in approaches 
to understanding legal nature of a “discretion in 
law” category.
For a long time the discretion problem 
has been a subject for criticism in the scientific 
world. Thus, Charles-Louis Montesquieu 
pointed out complexities arising in the process 
of law enforcement, and insisted on a mode 
of strict legality. “Judges of the people … are 
no more than the lips saying words of the law, 
lifeless beings which can neither moderate force 
of the law nor soften its severity … Nature of 
the republican government demands the judge 
not to recede from the letter of the law”. The 
major argument in favour of the principle of 
legality and against law application at discretion 
is uniformity in protection of citizens. The 
philosopher highlighted that today the court 
“should operate the way it did yesterday in order 
citizens’ property and life to be so strongly 
secured as the state system itself. Invariability 
must reign in sentences so that they always 
are the exact application of the text of the 
law” (Montesquieu, 1955). Despite it, under 
M.V. Baglay’s fair remark, “discretion used 
to exist at that time but it has come in special 
demand now” (Baglay, 1999).
The Russian Dictionary under A.P. 
Evgenyeva’s edition defines ‘discretion’ as a 
conclusion, opinion, decision (Evgenyeva, 1999). 
To perceive is to come to a conclusion about 
availability of something, to recognize it as 
existing etc. Under V. Dal’s explanatory dictionary 
‘to perceive’, ‘to discover’ is interpreted as ‘to 
see, to open, to distinguish and to plan’ (Dal, 
1994). Short linguistic excursus gives the basis 
to ascertain the following: the term ‘discretion’ 
means ‘opinion’, ‘decision’ or ‘conclusion’, 
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while ‘to perceive’ means ‘to come to a certain 
conclusion’.
Research on the specified phenomenon 
is deemed more correct to begin with the law 
understanding issue clarification, in the framework 
of which it will be considered further.
The state-centric approach to law 
understanding prevailed in the Russian legal 
thought for a long time. It emphasized the 
regulatory school of law, to be more specific, its 
most rigid version. Law under such interpretation 
is perceived as a given one, as the scope of norms, 
external in relation to the individual system of 
rules, aimed at the guiding behaviour. 
In addition, such law understanding matched 
the developed idea about a legal norm as of a 
general, ‘typical’ behaviour pattern, according 
to which the subject of law shall operate, while 
no deviation from this rule is admissible. Law 
enforcing normative -regulatory means were not 
a basic element of law organisation. ‘Normative’ 
means fixing all-obligatory character of law 
as well as proper behaviour prevailing in its 
structure. 
It is well-known, that there is quite a lot 
of legal positivism or positive law definitions 
both in Russian and foreign literature. Firstly, 
positive law is defined precisely as “a sovereign’s 
orders, addressed to a person or persons who are 
submitted to him” (Harris et al., 1832). Secondly, 
it is simply defined as positive, official law, 
“issued first of all by the state bodies under the 
established order and fixed in regulatory legal 
acts in an appropriate way thereunder” (Uporov 
and others, 2000). Thirdly, positive law is 
considered as “a real, existing in laws and other 
documents, actually tangible, (and consequently 
-”positive “) normative regulator on the basis of 
which legally inadmissible definition is made 
and legally binding, imperatively authoritative 
decisions are passed by courts and other state 
bodies (Alexeev,1997).
To satisfy the present research goals it is 
necessary to dwell on those signs of a positive 
law which require considering the possibility of 
discretion under the given definition of law.
Firstly, it is imperative (in the broad meaning 
of the word) character of a positive law. One of 
the initial positive law postulates in different 
variations (democratic, authoritative, liberal and 
totalitarian) was and frequently remains within 
a semiveiled ‘civilised’ way, thus, supporting 
J. Austin’s thesis about law as “a sovereign’s 
orders” in the name of the state, the monarch or 
“other sovereign institution acting in the form 
of the supreme political institution (as supreme 
political superiors)” (Austin, 1832). These rules – 
orders – are perceived by various state bodies 
and primarily by courts as official standards, 
certain samples according to which justice must 
be administered and “in the framework of which 
all their behavior shall fall” (Dias, 1995).
Secondly, it is a formal-legal character of 
positive law. It finds its concrete expression in 
the most various forms (Hart, 1994). However, 
the main thing here is that priority in the positive 
law is given not to a social side in the form of 
the essence, content and social purpose but its 
formal-legal side. Those applying law following 
in the footsteps of the legislator, in France, Italy, 
Russia or any other country where in an invariable 
or modernized way traditions of positive law 
are preserved, are of the least interest in social, 
substantial aspects of law. Formal-legal and more 
often technical-legal aspects entirely replace and 
supersede them in the consciousness and actions 
of those applying law.
Under the given definition of law, possibility 
to act at discretion, independently, choosing a 
certain alternative of behaviour to satisfy own 
requirements, is considerably limited. The main 
thing for a person is to obey detailed imperious 
commands, orders without thinking them 
over, while the task of the legislator is to limit 
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discretion possibility, establishing discrete rules 
of behaviour and providing their execution by 
possibility of the state compulsion. Moreover, 
herein the discretion problem is represented 
as a derivative of legality. Authors especially 
emphasised that in the sphere of law application 
considered by them, the decision choice must 
be bound by the bounds of another sort, i.e. the 
purpose which is either stated by the legislator, or 
follows from the sense of the law.
The Perestroika transition period in the 
USSR, and then liberalization of a social and 
economic, political life in Russia radically 
changed the content and directions of a legal 
thought. Doctrines about a lawful state a civil 
society, human rights came in demand. Search 
for new approaches to studying law allowing 
to connect all known legal theories advantages 
together has became especially timely. 
At a certain distinction of the offered criteria, 
the general conciliating author’s positions is to 
include the concept of law, a human being, their 
rights and freedoms in the orbit of the issue .The 
problem first of all is to find the approach to law, 
where its philosophical understanding must be 
completely focused on a human. G.V. Maltsev 
writes, “I hope that under new understanding, 
the primordial sense of law making a way in its 
historical development, contrary to all obstacles 
and arbitrariness, provision and protection of 
human freedom, definition of its possibilities, 
borders and guarantees will be expressed” 
(Maltsev, 1990).
From the positions of the human-centric 
definition of law, the essence of law is stipulated 
by a human’s nature, their need for freedom, 
and self-determination. Freedom, in its turn, is 
expressed in the rights and freedoms. Therefore, 
the core deep issue in law is rights and freedoms 
of a person (Shafirov, 2004). Law is impossible 
without rights of a person, as well as law without 
and out of law. It allows to speak about law as 
of characteristic of a person; to single out a legal 
side of a person which content is made by rights 
and freedoms.
In other words, in comparison with the 
state-centric approach, the system of normative-
regulatory means is being formed. Law as a 
normative regulation is not reduced to norms or to 
their system. The legal norm is one of its displays, 
one of holders of the major characteristics of law. 
Therefore, in cases when the issue is a direct 
normative regulation over the entire complex of 
normative regulatory tools (principles, purposes, 
problems, definitions, norms, etc.) shall be 
associated with it acting as the internal form 
of expression of law as a common measure of 
freedom and justice. Orientation to norms only, 
that is to the phenomena of the most subjected to 
updatings, changes by lawmaking subjects, will 
inevitably lead to incorrect perception of the 
ideas fixed in law, as well as values, provisions, 
permissions and prohibitions, and as a result to 
a wrong, erroneous decision limiting discretion 
of a person and often impossible at all. The main 
thing that unites all variety of regulatory means 
from the point of human-centric approach to law 
is “a person’s and a citizen’s possibility to fulfill 
independent at their discretion actions fixed 
by these regulatory means of law” (Shafirov, 
2004). 
Having regarded a person and a citizen as of 
paramount importance, the law from the positions 
of human-centric approach does not prescribe 
the order and enforcements, but contains rights, 
possibilities for an independent, initiative and 
creative behaviour. Hence, it is not occasional 
that quintessence of the natural-positive law, as it 
has been noted above is expressed in the formula: 
“It is possible to do everything, that it is not 
forbidden by the law” (Shafirov, 2004). In other 
words, outside the accurately outlined circle of 
the forbidden, an individual is free in their choice 
and action.
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There exist a lot of different definitions of 
‘discretion’ concept in legal literature. 
According to R. Krauthauzen “free 
‘discretion’ means legal actions committed in the 
course of a personal responsibility and according 
to understanding of norm of law by the law 
empowering a person to fulfill aims laid down by 
the law” (Krauthausen, 1955).
K.Devis highlights: “The official of the state 
obtains discretion in that case when the power 
execution limits give him freedom in choosing 
behaviour, proceeding from possible options of 
actions and inaction” (Davis, 1969).
A.P. Korenev considers discretion to be “a 
certain degree of freedom of a body as defined by 
legislation within a legal solution of a specific case, 
granted to take optimum decision on the case” 
(Korenev, 1978). J.P. Solovey shares the same 
point of view: “discretion is urged to facilitate 
taking an optimum decision, i.e. providing for 
achieving the goals established by law at most” 
(Solovey, 1982). 
O.A.Papkova considers discretion to be a 
specific kind of a law enforcing activity adjusted 
by the law norms, executed in the procedure the 
essence of which is to grant power to individually 
resolve a disputable legal issue on the basis of 
law norms in certain cases, proceeding the goals 
pursued by the legislator, principles of law and 
other general provisions of the law, concrete 
circumstances of the case as well as from the 
commencement of rationality, conscientiousness, 
justice and moral bases (Papkova, 1997).
A. Barrak offered the following definition 
of the phenomenon in question “discretion is the 
authority given to the person possessing power to 
choose between two or more alternatives, where 
each of the alternatives is lawful” (Barrack, 
1999).
According to J.A.Tikhomirov, discretion is 
a motivated choice to take lawful decisions and 
perform actions by a law empowered subject 
within the limits of its competence to perform the 
tasks in view (Tikhomirov, 2000).
Analysis of the given definitions shows 
that the majority of authors are inclined to see 
an official or a law enforcing body vested with 
state-powerful authorities within its competence 
to be a subject vested with possibility to operate 
at discretion. In addition, the authors specify that 
activity at discretion has purposeful character 
and is mainly contained in law norms. 
However, opinions concerning legal nature 
of the given phenomenon are different. Some 
authors understand discretion as a certain degree 
of freedom in actions of those who apply law, 
others as authority given to them to decide upon 
a certain issue.
From positions of the human-centric 
understanding it is deemed to be feasible to 
single out the following features distinguishing 
a ‘discretion’:
1. It is implemented by any capable subjects 
of law. The possibility of citizens to operate at 
own discretion in the legal space is not always 
admitted. Moreover, some authors especially 
emphasized that availability of authoritative 
powers is an obligatory condition of investment 
with the right to discretion (Sharnina, 2008).
However, in our opinion, the similar 
approach is hardly grounded. So, the use of right 
is the form of the right implementation when 
subjects at own discretion and wish use the rights 
and possibilities given to them, as well as satisfy 
legitimate interests. As scientists highlight, 
‘using’ the right is based on the initiative of the 
subject, its discretion; in other words, action of 
the mechanism of legal regulation per se depends 
here on the will of the subjective right holder 
(Shafirov, 1982).
Thus, the possibility to operate at own 
discretion belongs not only to public authorities in 
the process of law enforcement, but also to citizens 
while implementing their rights and freedoms. 
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Thus, it is important to notice, that in the course 
of enjoying their right, a citizen implements 
discretion twice. The first time is when they 
choose the subjective right which allows to satisfy 
their interest to the greatest possible extent, and 
the second time is at implementing the selected 
right.
2. It is carried out through an authorized 
normative-regulatory means system. Direct 
rights and freedoms operation of a person is 
a universally recognized fact. However, the 
given fact recognition should not shadow, 
deminish own potentialities of a positive law. 
The majority of a person’s and citizen’s rights 
and freedoms are fixed in the positive law 
comprising its content. Therefore, it is not 
required to leave the boundaries of positive legal 
field to decide a predominant part of important 
issues. After the positive law being added with 
a natural one, their mutual close overlapping, 
the centre of gravity in the legal regulation 
moved from the establishment of what is due 
to the establishment of what is allowed. It 
has essentially increased the value of those 
rules of behaviour which without any order 
or prescription are capable of being effective, 
expedient, valuable landmarks for individuals’ 
free choice and active actions at their own 
discretion. The whole complex of normative-
regulatory means fixed by the objective 
law, i.e. permissions, is softly, without any 
pressure, directing a person’s free choice and 
active behaviour in the modern jurisprudence. 
It is these permissions that are the source of 
discretion for subjects of law. 
The structure of normative-regulatory 
means of permissions is made by subsystems 
of normative generalizations and authorizing 
norms. 
Goals, tasks, legal principles, legal 
definitions, legal fictions and so on and so 
forth are referred to normative generalizations. 
Possibilities put in them give the widest scope 
for a personal discretion, initiative; creativity for 
legislative regulation of behaviour is extremely 
restrained and is mainly reduced only to the 
generalising, compressed formulations.
Authorising norms are notable for a bigger 
concreteness of rights and freedoms content 
wordings. It does not exclude, but assumes self-
determination, self-regulation of the person. 
Alternative, situational norms should be referred 
to norms-permissions.
All-allowed type of legal regulation opening 
the scope for a free choice and vigorous activity, 
promoting (or at least not interfering with) 
initiative, independence in these or those tasks 
solution is based on an allowed normative-
regulatory means system. 
It is emphasized in literature that the 
principle that everything is permitted except that 
is directly forbidden, does not match activity 
regulation in the sphere of law enforcement 
where an allowing order and identification of the 
exclusive competence of the administration must 
be applied. The exhaustive list of its rights and 
duties where “only that is allowed that is directly 
authorised by law” is a principle creating strictly 
lawful basis for public power bodies’ discretion 
(Alexeev, 1987; Matuzov, 1999). 
In our opinion, granting freedom to public 
authorities can be one of the means to achieve 
the main goal of law, i.e. protection of a person 
and creation of conditions for realization of rights 
and freedoms belonging to them, a guarantee of 
inadmissibility of unlawful decisions taking, a 
way of strengthening legality and law order. 
So, the American model of precedent 
specifies admissibility of American courts 
‘evasion’ from “even the clearest statute text if 
strict compliance with it and, accordingly, direct 
application of the given statute can lead to an 
absurd result” in the process of law application. 
(Manning, 2003).
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Similar “deviation from the text, and actually 
partially from the sense of the law, authorised 
by the Supreme court of the USA more than a 
century ago and resulted subsequently into a so-
called “the absurdity doctrine” (The Absurdity 
Doctrine), despite sharp criticism is still vigorous 
and meaningful. (Sunstein, 1995).
As an example, it is possible to refer to 1998 
precedent-related court decision on “Clinton 
vs. New York” where the court hearing the 
case refused to follow the New York state law 
directly connected with the case in question (The 
Line Ibem Veto Act) in that part of it, where it 
contradicted with the Federal legislation, since 
the terms ‘individual’ and ‘the individual’ cover 
not only natural persons but various trading 
and other firms and associations (Clinton vs. 
New York, 1998). Court’s refusal in this case, to 
strictly follow the text, but not the sense of the 
law is explained and is legally justified by the fact 
that following an “absurd” text, from the point 
of view of the conventional terminology and 
common sense, will inevitably lead to “absurd” 
result from the legal point of view1 (Manning, 
2003). 
Thus, the greatest possibilities for the subject 
of law to act at discretion, at choice of means 
and ways to satisfy own needs are given under 
an all-allowed type of legal regulation in the 
presence of the functioning system of authorizing 
normatively-regulatory means.
3. Has a purposeful character. The Big 
Explanatory Russian Dictionary defines ‘aim’ 
as “something that is aspired and is wished to be 
reached”. Activity at discretion cannot be aimless, 
it is always important to realize precisely, for the 
sake of what it is achieved.
Proceeding from a systemic interpretation 
of some provisions of the Russian Federation 
Constitution, a person and their rights and 
freedoms are required to understand the main 
goal of law (Shafirov, 2004). The given goal 
predetermines the sense and content of the activity 
at discretion – protection of rights, freedoms 
and legitimate interests of a person, granting 
possibility and creating favorable conditions for 
rights and freedoms implementation. 
4. Has an intellectual-strong-willed 
character. Analysing discretion in law 
institution, it is necessary to take into 
account that it mainly concerns the subjective 
(psychological) element of a lawful behaviour. 
Discretion contains intellectual and strong-
willed aspects. Intellectual element of discretion 
is characterised by the fact that the subject, 
proceeding from the analysis of the rule of 
behaviour and certain life circumstances, 
realizes the possibility of choosing certain 
ways of behaviour given by the law to achieve 
a goal, and also foresees possible consequences 
which can happen. The strong-willed element 
is expressed in the desire to act according to 
the accepted decision and readiness to make 
necessary efforts for this goal.
5. It is revealed at every stage of a legal 
regulation (discretion is at a normative basis 
construction when the legislator designs rules 
of law and normative generalizations at own 
discretion; at legal relation occurrence when the 
subject of law per se defines whether to enter the 
legal relation or not, defines its content at own 
discretion; at realization of subjective rights when 
an authorized person carries out simultaneously 
all or randomly chosen legal powers arisen within 
the limits of certain legal relation).
Thus, it is possible to define the discretion 
in law as an implemented through allowed 
normatively-regulatory means creative, 
reasonable, strong-willed and lawful activity 
of a capable person aimed at the fullest and 
effective implementation of the person’s rights 
and freedoms.
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1 Probably, having applied the judicial discretion, proceeding from legislative purposes, the court would have managed 
to avoid an absurd situation described in the Russian newspaper on 18.03.2008 when according to the judgement the 
parent supporting the child, had appeared to be obliged to pay the alimony on his support to the other parent only be-
cause when filing the claim on definition of the child’s residence at his mother residence the latter did not include the 
requirement on her release from the alimony payment for the child’s support in a subject matter of the claim (Shafirov, 
2009).
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Усмотрение в праве:  
человекоцентристский подход
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Статья посвящена анализу категории усмотрения в праве. В статье сделана попытка 
сформулировать понятие усмотрения в праве с позиций человекоцентристского подхода к 
правопониманию и выделить его основные признаки.
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